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ECONOMIC PLANNING IN THE LIGHT OF PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION
N THE midst of technological supremacy brought about by
science and machinery, mankind has been overwhelmed
by a great social disaster. The industrial machine does not
seem to function. In spite of the ability of society to produce
plenty for all, there is bitter poverty, unemployment and
insecurity.
Voices in increasing number and insistence demand that
the nation embark upon a policy of economic planning, looking to social control of industry, commerce and finance.'
Some demand the setting up of a national economic council;
others, the creation of national industrial syndicates or
trusts; others, the organization of trade associations with
power to limit and regulate production in accordance with
estimated needs; and still others advocate the public ownership and operation of the basic industries of the country as
indispensable to a planned economy in which periodic industrial depressions with their toll of human misery will be
unknown.
If industry, commerce and finance remain privately
owned and operated, then social control to be effective presupposes regulation in a very real sense. Since one of the
objects'sought to be attained is the balancing of production
with consumption, and in that way regularize employment,
there must, of necessity, be a power somewhere to limit or
regulate production not to exceed the estimated demand; to
ascertain by means of research and investigation what the
need consists of; to prorate the needed output among the
constituent business houses, and to prevent the entry into
business of anyone without first obtaining a certificate of
convenience and necessity, or its equivalent. That means the
repeal of the Sherman Ant*i-trust Law and the setting up
and the fostering of monopolies. It means the official death
of the competitive system. But that also means that the
American people would be exposed to oppressive charges,
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high prices and all the other abuses flowing from unbridled
monopoly, unless effective regulation can be set up to fix
prices and rates and to supervise the issuance of securities.
Is such regulation possible under our constitution? Has
experience in public utility regulation furnished us with any
light to guide us?
Whatever the difficulties, intelligent public opinion is
agreed that profound social changes must be made to correspond to the needs and realities of our time. These will, of
course, impose new strains upon government since it must
assume new functions.
The American historian, Charles A. Beard, describes the
situation thus: 2
"Natural science and machinery have set a new
and complex stage for the operations of government,
imposed additional functions upon it, and lifted it to
a new role in the process of civilization. No longer
can it be correctly considered as a mere group of legal
authorities set apart from private citizens to make
and enforce simple rules of law. The election, terms,
salaries, and duties of public officials-the staples of
formal politics-are all incidents in a larger strategy.
Even the most learned discussion of them throws
little light on the social origins of government, the
deeper causes of its form, policies, and tactics, or its
place in the unfolding of national destiny and international relations. Philosophically surveyed, it appears as a product and organ of world movements;
more than a collection of mechanical devices for getting work done in limited time and space."
The technological revolution has, undoubtedly, affected
the theory and practice of government and its institutions.
Of all the voices recognizing the need of, and calling for,
readjustment, the lawyers' is the least audible. Yet the personnel of our government, in legislative, executive and judicial branches, as well as those in charge of the administrative
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commissions, bureaus and departments, consists, in the main,
of lawyers. Has the legal profession a contribution to make
to the fashioning of the new governmental agencies? Is the
law sufficiently elastic and alive to bridge the gap which,
admittedly, exists between itself and social necessities? If
law and government are to serve as stabilizers of civilization,
they will have to be progressive and flexible. Sir Henry Main
summed up this problem of the law, thus: 3
"Social interests and social opinion are always
more or less in advance of law. We may come indefinitely near the closing gap between them, but it has a
perpetual tendency to reopen. Law is stable. The
societies we are speaking of are progressive. The
greater or lesser happiness of a people depends on
the degree of promptitude with which the gulf is narrowed."
Just as the great need of the eighteenth century was
the forging of legal institutions to guarantee to the people
political security and civil rights, so the great need of our
time is the creation of legal institutions to give to our people
economic security and social justice. The sociological concept of jurisprudence recognizes this. A. W. Spencer, former
editor of THE GREEN BooK, writing on Sociology and the
Law, declared that it 4
"refuses to isolate the law from life in general and
that it treats law not as an inflexible formula, to be
expounded only by accomplished technicians, but also
as a flexible social institution to be treated, like all
other institutions, with regard to the utility of the
end served and the nature of the function it seeks to
fulfill. ** * With the sociological jurist the readjustment of the law to meet new social demands is not
simply an actual tendency but a moral necessity. * * *
Only through such adjustment can the law attain its
highest efficiency. * * * The immediate result of the
'ANCIENT LAW, c. II (Dutton, 1917).
'Sociology and the Law, 2 Mm-WEST
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new attitude will be an altered interpretation of current problems of social and economic legislation, and
there must inevitably be a reaction against the timeworn precedents of the common law and a deliberate
attempt to substitute new rules for old. This means
that many of the highly individualistic conceptions
which survive the common law, and are really anachronist ic, being derived from doctrines long since
abandoned, must yield to a modern ideal of social
justice."
Writing in a similar vein, Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo says:
"Courts know today that statutes are to be
viewed, not in isolation or in vacuo, as pronouncements of abstract principles for the guidance of an
ideal community, but in the setting and the framework of present-day conditions as revealed by the
labors of economists and students of the social sciences
in our country and abroad."
To be useful to the movements seeking a new orientation
in accordance with the social exigencies of our time, the
lawyer must co-operate with the economists and students of
the social sciences. In the present emergency, Mr. Justice
Brandeis (with whom Mr. Justice Stone concurs) sounds
the clarion call: I
"The people of the United States are now confronted with an emergency more serious than war.
Misery is widespread in a time not of scarcity but of
overabundance. The long-continued depression has
brought unprecedented unemployment, a catastrophic
fall in commodity prices and a volume of economic
losses which threatens our financial institutions. Some
people believe that the existing conditions threaten
even the stability of the capitalistic system.
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Yale Univ. Press, 1925) p. 81.
'Dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, U. S. (decided March 21, 1932).
'THE
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"Economists are searching for the causes of this
disorder and are re-examining the basis of our industrial structure. Business men are seeking possible
remedies. Most of them realize that failure to distribute widely the profits of industry has been a prime
cause of our present plight. But rightly or wrongly,
many persons think that one of the major contributing
causes has been unbridled competition.
"Increasingly doubt is expressed whether it is economically wise, or morally right, that men should be
permitted to add to the producing facilities of an
industry which is already suffering from overcapacity.
In justification of that doubt, men point to the excesscapacity of our productive facilities resulting from
their vast expansion without corresponding increase
in the consumptive capacity of the people. They assert
that through improved methods of manufacture, made
possible by advances in science and invention and
vast accumulation of capital, our industries had become capable of producing from 30 to 100 per cent
more than was consumed even in days of vaunted prosperity; and that the present capacity will, for a long
time, exceed the needs of business.
"All agree that irregularity in employment-the
greatest of our evils-cannot be overcome unless production and consumption are more nearly balanced.
Many insist there must be some form of economic
control. There are plans for proration. There are proposals for stabilization.
"Some thoughtful men of wide experience insist
that all projects for stabilization and proration must
prove futile unless, in some way, the equivalent of
the certificate of public convenience and necessity is
made a prerequisite to embarking new capital in an
industry in which the capacity already exceeds the
production schedules.
"Whether that view is sound nobody knows. The
objections to the proposal are obvious and grave. The
remedy might bring evils worse than the present
disease. The obstacles to success seem insuperable.
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Economic and social sciences are largely uncharted
seas. * * *
"To stay experimentation within the law in
things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to such experimentation may be
fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the Federal system that
a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. This court has the power to stay such experimentat.ion. We may strike down the statute embodying it on the ground that, in our opinion, it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; for the due-process
clause has been held applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in
the exercise of this power we should ever be on guard,
lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If
we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our
minds be bold."
Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, which
declared the Oklahoma statute regulating the ice business
unconstitutional, stated: 7
"Plainly, a regulation which has the effect of
denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right
to engage in a lawful private business, such as that
under review, cannot be upheld consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment. Under that Amendment,
nothing is more clearly settled than that it is beyond
the power of a state, 'Under the guise of protecting
the public, arbitrarily [to] interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them.'"
The concept underlying this decision is that of a system
of production, based on free competition. Of course, the
inevitable march of events will compel American jurispru7 Ibid. -

U. S. -.
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dence to abandon this concept and follow the more realistic
views set forth in the opinion of the dissenting Judges. In an
age of great concentration of wealth production and billiondollar mergers, there may be competition of a sort, but, as
a prevailing system, it has been relegated to history.
The advocates of social control, through regulation, must
first cross the legal bridge set up by the view of the majority
of the court in the New State Ice Co. case. Assuming, however, that a legislative program for such control is properly
presented to the court and it holds, as it very likely will, that
the basic industries, commerce and finance are affected with
a "public use," then what? It means that regulation will
be lawful.
But the legal and economic student must go further
than merely remove the Law's obstruction to regulation.
There is a creative and constructive side which lays claim
upon him. He must enquire, is regulation effective? Does
our experience with regulation, where it has been tried in
the public utility field, warrant its extension to the whole
of industry? Can it meet the hopes and expectations of a
nation groping for a solution of its economic and social ills?
All of these questions need a candid answer if we are, indeed,
to make progress instead of merely inviting change. Though
desirous to leave the community free to experiment, to solve
its problems by the scientific "process of trial and error,"
Mr. Justice Brandeis, himself, is none too sanguine about
regulation. For, he declares: 8
"We have been none too successful in the modest
essays in economic control already entered upon. The
new proposal involves a vast extension of the area of
control. Merely to acquire the knowledge required as
a basis for the exercise of this multitude of judgments
would be a formidable task."
Judge Brandeis, undoubtedly, referred to public utility
regulation when he said that "we have been none too successful" in the economic control already entered upon. It
8
Ibid. dissenting opinion in New State Ice Company of Oklahoma v. Liebmann, - U. S. -.
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should be borne in mind that the utility business affords a
favorable field for regulation. If it was none too successful
here, is there any hope for its success in the vastly larger
and more complex field of business and commerce generally?
A brief review of public utility regulation and its problems
will now be helpful.
Public utilities may be defined as the business of selling
commodities or furnishing services vitally necessary to public health, comfort and convenience. Under privileges specially conferred, they operate as monopolies and are endowed
with sovereign powers such as the right of eminent domain.
Following the doctrine long established in regard to railroads, the furnishing of public utility services such as communication, light, heat, power and water, has come to be
treated as public business. The companies are exercising a
public function and are, supposedly, the agents of the State.
What these companies mean in terms of cost to the American
people has been emphatically stated in the report to the New
York Legislature by its Commission on Revision of the Public Service Commission Law: 9
"When it is considered that the total annual income
of the public utilities in the country approximates
$10,000,000,000, the necessity of subjecting the methods whereby such earnings are determined to the
most careful criticism and review, is obvious. This is
a matter of national concern."
The utility companies have been granted monopoly
rights by which they levy an annual toll on the American
people over three times as large as that collected by the
United States every year to carry on the national government. It amounts to an annual tax of a little over $400 on
every family.
Regulation may be defined as an effort by the State and
nation, through the establishment of commissions, to super'Majority
(1930).
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vise and control the operation of the utility companies so as
to secure to the public adequate services and reasonable
charges. Wisconsin was the first state to establish, in 1907,
a permanent, presumably expert, regulation commission.
New York followed the same year. At the present time, every
state but one has a regulation commission. The Federal government has its own regulatory machinery.
After twenty-three years of experience with systematic
regulation by the Public Service Commission, New York
State created a commission charged with the duty of "ascertaining whether the Public Service Commission Law * * *
accomplishes the objects for which the system of state regulation was established." The minority report submitted to
the Legislature states this basic finding: 10
"On the basis of this intensive investigation, we
find that effective public utility regulation in the state
of New York has broken down and that the consumers
of the state have been abandoned to the exploitation
of the public utility companies without any effective
restraint by the Public Service Commission."
In another place, the Commissioners add the warning
or the threat, that 11
"Unless effective regulation can be restored, there is
bound to be a rapid shift of public opinion in favor
of public ownership and operation."
The majority of the Commission, thrbugh its counsel,
reported to the Legislature the same conclusion in somewhat
more cautious language, by saying: 12
"Leaders of utilities must look upon themselves
as economic servants of the public, as the State officials are the political servants of the public. If this
"Minority report, p. 23; Report of Commissioners Walsh, Bonbright and
Adie, p. 258.

' Ibid. p. 1; ibid. p. 245 .
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is only an Utopian idea, then, in my judgment, regulation is impossible. The alternative is not coercion,
because that can only bring resort to the courts with
resultant resentment and bitterness. The only feasible alternative is public ownership * * *"
According to this view, the State is helpless unless the
Utility Leaders are willing to regard themselves as public
servants. What if they do not? And why should they be
expected to, any more than we expect the leaders of other
private business to act as "servants of the public." After all,
their motive for being in the utility business is the private
profit they make out of it. We are told that legal coercion is
useless because the companies will "resort to the courts."
But why should their resort to the courts prevent state coercion, if that becomes necessary in the public interest to
secure adequate service at reasonable rates?
The answer lies in a series of Supreme Court decisions
beginning with the Minnesota Rate case, in 1890.13 The
courts' view of the meaning of the terms "property" and
"liberty" as used in the Constitution of the United States
has undergone revolutionary changes since the Slaughterhouse cases, in 1872.14 The courts' construction of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments profoundly influenced the economic history of the country.
The Fifth Amendment, adopted in 1791, is applicable to
the Federal Government. It provides that no person shall be
"deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation." The Fourteenth Amendment,
adopted in 1868, is applicable to state governments. It
provides:
"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct.

418 (1889).
" Slaughter-house cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 U. S.36 (1872).
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In 1872, the Supreme Court of the United States was
called upon to decide the constitutionality of a Louisiana
State statute granting to a corporation a monopoly to maintain slaughter-houses and regulating the rates to be charged
to butchers dealing with the corporation. 15 The Court divided.
The majority held the statute constitutional. The prevailing
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Miller, contended that the
statute did not deprive the complainants of "property" or
"liberty" in the sense used in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The word "liberty" should be construed with
reference to the purposes of the amendments, which were to
free the colored people from slavery, said the Court. Before
the amendments, the liberty of citizens was in the keeping
of the states. The amendments did not serve to transfer to
the Federal Government the protection of all liberty. They
only transferred from the states that fraction of liberty which
is comprehended in the freedom from personal slavery.
The word "property" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment had the meaning given to that term by the common
law, namely, physical things held by the owner; something
tangible.
"Under no construction of that provision that
we have ever seen," declared the Court, "can the restraint imposed by the state of Louisiana upon the
exercise of their trade by the butchers of New Orleans
be held to be a deprivation of property within the
meaning of that provision." "I
Contrast this with the decision in the New State Ice Co.
case, decided by the same Court on March 22, 1932. One can
see at a glance the profound change in American Jurisprudence wrought in the last sixty years.
The minority opinion in the Slaughter-house cases foreshadowed the law as it is today. Justice Bradley, in one of
the minority opinions, wrote that:
"The right to choose one's calling is an essential
part of that liberty which it is the object: of governIbid.
'8 Ibid. at pp. 69, 73.
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ment to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a man's
property and right. * * * The right of choice is a
portion of their property." 17
No authorities were cited by the minority to sustain
their definition of the terms "property" or "liberty." Twelve
years later, in 1884, in the second Slaughter-house case,1 8
Justice Field, of the minority in the first cases, now suggested 10 the source of their 2 new
definition as being that of
0
Adam Smith, who had said:
"The property which every man has in his own
labor, as it is the original foundation of all other
property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable."
Thus, the definition of the term "property" in its present
constitutional sense which gradually crept into the state
and Federal decisions, and is now settled law, is not to be
found in the Constitution itself at all, but is the result of
the Supreme Court's translation into law of Adam Smith's
economic concepts of property.
The decision, in 1876, in Munn v. 11linois,21 is usually
regarded as "the beginning of the present era of public control." But, in that case, the Court's conception of "property"
was not that of the later cases, beginning in the Nineties.
The case of Munn v. Illinois involved a statute enacted
by the Legislature of the state of Illinois, regulating the
charges for services by grain elevators. Attacked as unconstitutional because it deprived the owners of their property
without "due process of law," the United States Supreme
Court, conformable to its Slaughter-house decision, four
years earlier, upheld the statute on the ground that it did
not deprive the owners of property in the sense in which that
term is used in the Fourteenth Amendment, and, therefore,
was not subject to restraint by the Federal courts. The state
' Ibid. at pp. 116, 122.
"Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent Suit Co., 111 U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. 652

( 1883).
" Ibid. at p. 757.
' I SMITH, WALTH OF NATiONS
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of Illinois was merely regulating the "use and enjoyment"
of the property, and that was a proper exercise of the police
power.
The minority again dissented. Justice Field for the
minority, answering the state court, which held the statute
good because no property was "taken" from the owners since
they were not deprived of "title and possession," said: 22
"There is indeed no protection of any value under
the constitutional provision which does not extend to
the use and income of the property, as well as to its
title and possession."
But the Const itution never restrained legislative action
affecting the "use and income of property." It only refers to
"property," and that term, at the time of the adoption of the
Amendment, had the common-law meaning of physical things
held by the owner. Only by reading into the Constitution
after the word "property," the words "or the use and income
thereof," can the minority view and the present decisions
be explained.
Fourteen years after the Munn case, in 1890, in the
Minnesota Rate case, 23 wherein the railroads objected to a
Minnesota statute, fixing rates, the Court adopted the views
of the minority in the Munn case, with respect to the meaning of the term "property." Writing the prevailing opinion,
Justice Blatchford said:
"This power to regulate is not a power to destroy,
and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation." 24
What constitutes a reasonable rate and when such a rate
amounts to "confiscation" is declared to be "eminently a
question for judicial investigation, requiring due process' of
law for its determination." 25
Thus the courts' transformation of the constitutional
concept of property from being physical things, objects of
Ibid. at p. 143.
'Supra note 13.
Ibid. at p. 456.
Ibid. at p. 458.

PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION

the owner's private use in the sense of "having title and possession" to the thing itself into a concept of intangible and
incorporeal property arising from the right to the "use and
income" of such property, had become complete with the
Mimnesota Rate case. The judiciary now became the arbiter
of how far the states may go in their regulation. If they
"take" too much, amounting to "confiscation," the courts
will step in.
From this there is only one short step to the celebrated
case of Snmythe v. Ames, 20 decided in 1897. In the midst of
the severe economic depression of that time, the state of
Nebraska sought to relieve its people from the exorbitant
freight charges made by the railroads, by fixing lower rates.
Stockholders of railroads affected filed suits to restrain the
State and the companies from promulgating the prescribed
freight schedules on the ground that the statute limiting the rates is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Was the legislative act a "taking" of property without due
process of law? That involved the determination of whether
the prescribed rates would yield such a return on the railroad's properties as would afford them protection in the "use
and income" of their properties. What must such a return
be? And upon what "value" shall it be based? The stockholders contended that the infallible rule for determining
value was the outstanding securities, the stocks and bonds
of the railroads; and that the return must be sufficient to
pay all expenses, carrying charges, obligations, interest on
bonds and dividends on stock. The public representatives
objected. The roads were over-capitalized. The securities
were heavily watered. As a result of the severe depression
that was a time of low and declining prices. William Jennings Bryan, appearing as one of counsel for the State,
argued vigorously that the sound rule for determining value
is the cost of reproduction of the properties.
Admitting that the questions presented were "embarrassing" since they involved issues more concerned with economics than with law, the Court nevertheless sustained
the stockholders and declared the law unconstitutional. It
' 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1897).
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held that the railroads were entitled to a fair return on the
"fair value of the property," 27 and, in determining such
value, consideration should be given to the following six

factors:

28

the original cost of construction," (2)
"the amount expended in permanent improvements,"
(3) "the amount and market value of its bonds and
stocks," (4) "the present as compared with the original cost of construction," (5) "the probable earning
capacity of the company under particular rates prescribed by statute," (6) "and the sum required to pay
operating expenses * * * and are to be given such
weight as may be just and right in each case. We do
not say that there may not be other matters to be
regarded in estimating the value of the property. What
entitled to ask is a fair return on the
the company .is
value of that which it employs for the public convenience."

(1) "**

*

Thus, no formula is set up by which value for ratemaking purposes can be determined with certainty. Each of
the six factors above enumerated is "to be given such weight
as m y be just and right in each case." As if these Ivere
not indefinite enough, the Court added that there may be
"other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the
property."
The decision was followed consistently and its principles
reaffirmed in the famous O'Fallon case,2 9 in which the Court,
(three members dissenting) held that the Interstate Commerce Commission failed to give "due consideration to all
the elements of value recognized by the law of the land for
rate-making purposes."
In this connection it is important to remember two
propositions: First, that valuation must be determined on
the basis of conditions existing at the time under investigaIbid. at pp. 489, 490.
Ibid. at p. 547.
St. Louis and O'Fallon R. R. Co. v. U. S., 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct.
384 (1928).
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tion, not on the basis of costs in the past. It is the "present
value" that counts.
Second, that the "law of the land" applicable to valuation of utility property has been held to be a constitutional
question. It does not rest upon legislative foundations and,
therefore, cannot be changed by statute.
In the second Minnesota Rate cases, decided in 1912,
Mr. Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, stated: 30
"It is clear that in ascertaining the present value
we are not limited to the consideration of the amount
of the actual investment. If that has been reckless or
improvident, losses may be sustained which the community does not underwrite. As the company may not
be protected in its actual investment, if the value of
its property be plainly less, so the making of a just
return for the use of the property involves the recognition of its fair value if it be more than its cost. The
property is held in private ownership and it is that
property, and not the original cost of it, of which the
owner may not be deprived without due process of
law."
Dr. John Bauer, appearing frequently for the public in
rate controversies, advocate of the "prudent investment"
theory for ascertaining value as a means of making regulation effective, seeks to explain 31 away the courts' declaration
that "the property is held in private ownership and it is that
property, and not the original cost of it of which the owner
may not be deprived without due process of law." He asks:
"But why conclude that Justice Hughes meant
actually to apply the condemnation idea, and thus do
violence to other underlying conceptions of public
utility relations recognized by the Court since the time
of fzinn v. Illinois in 1876?"
The answer is that the "underlying conception of public
utility relations" recognized by the majority in Munn v.
:°230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1912).
"JoHx
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Illinois have been definitely abandoned by the Court as far
back as the first Minnesota Rate case.32 And ever since that
case the Court adhered to its new interpretation of the meaning of the term "property" as used in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because of this, valuation for ratemaking purposes has become a mere guess, and regulation a
practical impossibility. The New York Commission on Revision of the Public Service Commission Law, reporting to
the Legislature in 1930, summed up this phase of the problem
in these words :33
"There is no problem * * * more complex and
about which opinion is more at variance, than the
problem of valuation. Upon its proper solution greatly
depends the future of public utility management. The
Supreme Court in its various decisions has built up a
policy for determining values that has resulted in a
variety of interpretations. This has resulted too frequently in failure to adopt a consistent policy of rate
control. The testimony in these proceedings shows
that in New York State in the absence of such a policy
each case must be handled for itself. * * * Where valuations have been made and a rate base determined,
rate regulation becomes in large part a matter of
arithmetic, but without it such regulation is at best
an approximate guess."
And the minority report of the same Commission makes
34
this emphatic declaration:
"We must assert at the start our conviction that
the unlimited power of utility companies to resort to
the Court in all rate cases means inevitably failure of
effective regulation."
Professor Felix Frankfurter sums up what he declares
to be the "heart of the defect" in regulation thus: 35
.Supra note 13.
' Majority Report, at pp. 50-51; Report of William J. Donovan, Counsel,
p. 90.
Minority Report, at p. 31; Report of Commissioners Walsh, Bonbright
and Adie, p. 262.
FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GoVERNMENT, p. 101 (Yale
University Press, 1930).
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"The heart of the difficulty is the current judicial
approach to utility valuation. Out of the constitutional provision safeguarding property against deprivation 'without due process of law,' the Supreme Court
has evolved a doctrine that a utility is entitled to a
fair return on its present 'value,' and 'value' must be
ascertained by giving weight, among other things, to
estimates of what it would cost to reproduce the property at the time of the rate hearing. The Supreme
Court has not given us a calculus of present value,
and it has left in conscious obscurity the amount of
weight to be given to reproduction cost. Some of its
language has, however, induced commissions and
lower courts to find that controlling effect should be
given to such cost."
In the practical administration of the problem, by the
time a rate base is determined, after an extensive and costly
proceeding, either before the Commission or the Court, or
both, it loses its validity because of the variable factors
involved. A conspicuous example is the Telephone Company
case. Since 1919 to date, the valuation of the properties of
the iNew York Telephone Company has been before the Public Service Commission of New York, in the Federal Courts,
back before the Commission-but no determination has yet
been made; the public in the meantime pays such rates as
are fixed or acquiesced in by the company. By the time a
hearing was completed, the findings became out of date.
"To the valuation of the property of the New York
Telephone Company case," declares the New York
Legislative Commission,36 "the Public Service Commission devoted more than three years. More than
25,000 pages of testimony was collected in formal
hearings. Following petitions in equity seeking to
enjoin the enforcement of the rates so fixed, the Federal Court appointed a master in equity who proceeded to revalue the property. He conducted 710
hearings at which 609 witnesses gave testimony
S'Spra note 33 at pp. 155, 156; smpra note 33 at p. 155.
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amounting to over 36,000 pages. 3,288 exhibits were
presented, several of them consisting of more than
one volume and one exhibit filling several volumes.
The time necessary for this revaluation exceeded four
years."
The companies, as well as the public, have learned from
experience that the former do not fare badly in the Federal
Courts. The New York Investigating Commission found
that: 7
"During the period of the present Public Service
Commission of New York, special masters have on
nine occasions been appointed by federal statutory
courts to determine the valuation of utility property.
In each of these investigations the master found the
schedule of charges fixed by public authority to be
insufficient to yield a fair return upon the fair value
of the property. In eight of these cases the Court
issued a permanent injunction restraining the Public
Service Commission from enforcing the rates on the
ground that for the Commission so to do would deprive the utility corporation of its property without
due process of law. In each of these eight cases the
schedule of charges in question was fixed not by the
Commission but by a statute. In the ninth case, an
action by the New York Telephone Company to enjoin
the enforcement of rates fixed by the Commission, the
master reported that the rates were confiscatory. The
final determination by the Court while not completely
endorsing the finding of the master, permanently enjoined the enforcement of the rates fixed by the Commission on the ground that they were confiscatory."
The report adds : 38
"The state should not be required to surrender to
the judges of the national courts so essential a key to
the welfare of its people."
Ibid. at p. 155; ibid. at p. 154.
'Ibid. at p. 156; ibid. at p. 155.
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It is not the purpose of this article to present an exhaustive analysis of the law governing public utility regulation,
nor to discuss all the obstacles and difficulties involved. It
is intended merely to show how the underlying legal principles laid down by our courts affecting regulation of prices
and rates to be charged to consumers by the already recognized monopolies - the utility companies - make effective
regulation impossible, and its extension to the broader and
more complicated field of business, as a whole, socially
undesirable.

Social control, looking to a planned economy, cannot
rely upon regulation. In the case of utilities, both reports to
the New York Legislature by .its Commission, as we have
already seen, state that the alternativeto the failure of regulation is public ownership and operation. [Ed.-Italics
ours.] Joseph B. Eastman, a former member of the Massachusetts Public Service Commission and, since 1919, a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission, sets forth his
views, "the product of twenty-five years' observation of and
experience with Public Utilities," as follows: 39
"It is still a custom to brand the idea of public
ownership and operation as 'socialistic,' and dismiss
it with that brand as opposed to what has been called
rugged American individualism. But this is use of
words to paralyze rather than promote thought. As a
matter of fact our individualism has always been tempered to a considerable degree with socialism, and the
tendency has been to increase that degree. We have
found that certain activities can best be carried on by
the government for the common good, instead of being
left to private enterprise. Illustrations, which could
be multiplied, are parks, highways and bridges,
schools, fire protection, postal service, and water supply. All these could be, have been, or to some extent
Joseph B. Eastman, A Plai for Public Ownership and Operation (January, 1932) 159 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE,

pt. I, at p. 112.
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still are, carried on by private enterprises. We have
found that these activities and numerous others can
with advantage be socialized, and in that form they
now have their place among accepted American institutions. In such instances government has superseded,
or at least invaded, the domain of business. There
may be those who shudder at the thought, but certainly they are not conspicuous.
"Granting, therefore, that the public ownership
and operation of public utilities is socialistic, the
question presented is not one to -be settled by the
bandying of epithets or phrases, but is the intensely
practical question of whether these particular activities are of such a kind that they can with general
advantage be socialized, in whole or in part, like many
others which have already undergone that change."
Paradoxically enough, the "law of the land" which so
severely hampers regulation, does not interfere with the
public going into business directly through agencies of their
choice.
In 1919, the state of North Dakota enacted a legislative
program which provided that the State engage in the business
of manufacturing and marketing farm products, of providing
homes for the people, of owning and operating utilities, of
establishing a system of warehouses, elevators, flour mills,
factories, plants, machinery and equipment. An Industrial
Commission was created to be in general control of these
enterprises; and provision was made for the pledging of state
credit and for the issuance of bonds to finance the projects.
Green, a taxpayer, attacked this legislation as unconstitutional. By unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court rejected Green's plea and sustained the legislation.4 0 Though reaffirming the rule that "it has come to be
settled that the authority of the states to tax does not include
the right to impose taxes for merely private purposes," 41
the Court held: 42
0

Green v. Frazer, 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499 (1920).

"Ibid. at p. 238.
" Ibid. at p. 242.
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"The precise question herein involved, so far as we
have been able to discover, has never been presented
to this Court. The nearest approach to it is found
in Jones v. City of Portland,245 U. S. 217, in which
we held that an act of the state of Maine authorizing
cities or towns to establish and maintain wood, coal
and fuel yards for the purpose of selling these necessaries to the inhabitants of cities and towns, did not
deprive taxpayers of due process of law within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that case
we reiterated the attitude of the Court towards state
legislation, and repeating what had been said before,
that what was or was not a public use was a question
concerning which local authority, legislative and judicial, had special means of securing information to
enable them to form a judgment; * * *.
"In many instances states and municipalitieshave
in late years seen fit to enter upon projects to promote
the public welfare which in the past have been considered entirely within the domain of private enterprise."
The economic facts with regard to social control through
public ownership and operation are outside the scope of this
article. The literature on the subject is rich and available to
all with eyes to see. Irrespective of what thoughtful people
may think of one plan or another, this is certain: we are
living in a time of swiftly moving events, which may sweep
many things before us. The human institutions we know are
changing under our very eyes, and the great problem is to
make the change constructive and for the good of the greatest
number. The legal profession will do well to harken to the
eloquent words with which Justice Brandeis concludes his
dissenting opinion in the New State Ice Company case: "If
we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our
minds be bold."
Louis WALDMAN.

New York City.
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